One difficulty common to all these monadic theories is strongly suggested by Holmes' development of his social analogy—namely, it may be admitted that the scheme of social differentiation and adaptation in the community of similar cells which is the embryo, after the fashion of a social organism, would produce a differentiated organism *of some kind.* But why an organism precisely true to the pattern of the species in a vast multitude of features, both large and small ? Holmes' analogy would be fully adequate only if it were true that in every case in which a number of human individuals were thrown together, they (regardless of large differences of environment) should proceed to evolve a social organism which in every case conformed precisely to one and the same pattern. If we found this to occur, we should have to postulate, on the part of the individuals concerned, memory or memories of some society of that same pattern in which they had formerly lived and of their roles in that society ; or, at least, such memory in some one dominant member of the group, or in a few such members.

That is a difficulty of the monadic theory in respect of which its explanatory power is less than that of a frankly dualistic theory. For, if memory-traces of past activities and adaptations are really effective in the determination of the life-processes of organisms, a theory which attributes all the traces concerned to one unitary being by which they are retained in some

systematic organization must be more efficient than one which leaves them a mere unorganized crowd, borne by a number of individual beings which must somehow combine them in the work of guiding the life-processes of the composite organism in whose life they participate.